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Inflation Expectations, Learning, and Supermarket Prices: 
Evidence from Survey Experiments†
By Alberto Cavallo, Guillermo Cruces, and Ricardo Perez-Truglia*
Information frictions play a central role in the formation of house-
hold inflation expectations, but there is no consensus about their 
origins. We address this question with novel evidence from survey 
experiments. We document two main findings. First, individuals in 
low inflation contexts have significantly weaker priors about the 
inflation rate. This finding suggests that rational inattention may be 
an important source of information frictions. Second, cognitive lim-
itations also appear to be a source of information frictions: even 
when information about inflation statistics is available, individuals 
still place a significant weight on inaccurate sources of information, 
such as their memories of the price changes of the supermarket prod-
ucts they purchase. We discuss the implications of these findings for 
macroeconomic models and policymaking. (JEL D83, D84, E31, 
L11, L81, O11)
Expectations about macroeconomic variables play an essential role in economic theory and policymaking. Consumer inflation expectations, in particular, are 
key to understanding household consumption and investment decisions and ulti-
mately the impact of monetary policies. Although central banks seek to influence 
expectations, there is no consensus in the empirical literature on how household 
inflation expectations are formed or influenced (see Bernanke 2007; Bachmann, 
Berg, and Sims 2015; and Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2015).
Consumer surveys indicate that household inflation expectations tend to be 
much more heterogeneous than those of professional forecasters (Ranyard et al. 
2008, Armantier et al. 2013). The literature offers two main explanations for this 
difference. Some authors attribute it to rational inattention, according to which 
individuals only partly incorporate information on topics such as inflation, because 
acquiring that information is costly (relative to the potential gains from using that 
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 information). This explanation is particularly convincing in contexts of low infla-
tion, like the United States, where the potential financial cost of ignoring inflation is 
negligible for most households. Other authors argue that, in forming inflation expec-
tations, individuals use information derived from their personal experiences as con-
sumers, which can be both diverse and inaccurate (Bruine de Bruin, van der Klaauw, 
and Topa 2011; Malmendier and Nagel 2016; and Madeira and Zafar 2015). The 
evidence on information frictions cannot distinguish between different sources of 
frictions. These distinctions can be important, however, to the extent that different 
sources can lead to very different policy prescriptions.
We present evidence from a series of experiments specifically designed to test the 
hypotheses of rational inattention and personal consumer experience. In a series of 
online and offline surveys, we randomly provided subjects with information related 
to past inflation. We provided information from different sources, such as inflation 
statistics and tables with historical prices of specific supermarket products. We then 
measured the effects of this information on the subjects’ inflation expectations. With 
the help of a Bayesian learning model, we estimated how much weight subjects 
assigned to a given piece of information (e.g., an inflation statistic), relative to their 
prior beliefs about inflation.
The first goal of this paper is to provide a sharp test of the rational inattention 
model. To do so, we conducted survey experiments in two contexts: low inflation 
(i.e., the United States, where average annual inflation rate was 1.8 percent in the five 
years prior to our study) and high inflation (i.e., Argentina, where average annual 
inflation rate was around 22.5 percent over the same period).1 According to the 
rational inattention model, individuals in a high inflation context should have strong 
priors about inflation because the financial cost of misperceiving inflation is high. 
They should thus seek high quality information and do so more often (Mankiw, 
Reis, and Wolfers 2004; Carroll 2003). Consistent with this hypothesis, we find 
that individuals in the low inflation context had weaker priors about the inflation 
rate compared to those in the high inflation context. For example, when provided 
with information about inflation statistics or prices of specific supermarket products, 
individuals in the low inflation context (United States) assigned a weight of just 
15 percent to their prior beliefs, whereas individuals in the high inflation context 
(Argentina) assigned a weight of roughly 50 percent.
The second goal of this paper is to measure whether cognitive limitations are 
important sources of information frictions. To do so, we compared how individ-
uals incorporated two types of information about inflation: inflation statistics and 
historical prices for a handful of randomly selected supermarket products, which 
served as a proxy for the type of information that individuals obtain from personal 
shopping experiences.2 Relative to the average price change from a random set of 
six products, inflation statistics were much more precisely estimated. We expected 
an economic professional to assign all weight to the statistics information and to 
1 We do not use official inflation statistics for Argentina because they were widely discredited. We use instead 
alternative indicators compiled by the private sector, which are well known and widely cited in the media. 
2 The data was scraped off of the websites of some of the largest supermarkets in the United States and Argentina 
as part of the Billion Prices Project at MIT. 
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ignore the supermarket price information when given both pieces of information. 
Instead, when subjects were given these two types of information simultaneously, 
they implicitly assigned as much weight to supermarket prices as they did to infla-
tion statistics. In other words, even when information about inflation statistics was 
readily available, individuals assigned significant value to less accurate sources of 
information.3
Our experimental design tries to address a common criticism of survey experi-
ments that, instead of inducing genuine learning, the information provided in the 
experiment elicits spurious reactions. For instance, if an individual is told that the 
annual inflation rate was 2 percent and is later asked about inflation expectations, 
that individual may report an inflation expectation that is closer to 2 percent for 
spurious reasons, such as to please the interviewer (Goffman 1963), to avoid being 
perceived as ignorant, or because of unconscious numerical anchoring (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974).4 Indeed, to illustrate how easy it is to manipulate the subjects’ 
responses, we show that providing explicitly fictitious information on price changes 
had a statistically and economically significant effect on inflation expectations.
Our experimental design employed two methods for separating reactions based 
on genuine learning from those based on spurious learning. The first method 
exploits the condition that, if the reaction to the information was spurious, then the 
experimental effects should not persist for months after the information provision. 
The second method exploits the condition that, if the reaction to the information 
was spurious, then we should not observe effects on expectations about other nom-
inal variables that are intrinsically related to the inflation rate, such as the nominal 
interest rate. Results from these two methods suggest that concerns about spurious 
learning are justified and must be taken seriously, because half of the reactions to 
our informational treatments are spurious. Nevertheless, our main results remain 
unchanged after we control for spurious learning.
Another concern is that subjects may react to the information on supermarket 
prices that we provide because they perceive it as accurate but do not trust their 
own memories about supermarket prices. Also, using price memories to form infla-
tion expectations is misleading only insofar as those memories are inaccurate. 
Addressing these remaining questions requires data that would be difficult to col-
lect in an online survey. Thus, we conducted a unique consumer-intercept survey 
experiment to address these questions. Among other things, we recorded consum-
ers’ purchases by scanning participants’ supermarket receipts, which we linked to 
data on the actual historical prices of those same products at the same store. We also 
asked respondents to recall historical prices for a random selection of the items that 
they had just purchased, which allowed us to generate exogenous variations in the 
salience of the subjects’ own price memories. The evidence from this experiment 
suggests that individuals do use their own memories about supermarket prices when 
3 This result is also consistent with survey evidence presented by Bruine de Bruin, van der Klaauw, and Topa 
(2011), who show that, when asked about the inflation rate, most individuals report that they try to recall the prices 
of specific products. 
4 This criticism is common to survey experiments in general, not particularly to our application in the area of 
inflation expectations. See Rosenthal (1966) for a discussion of effects of this type in behavioral research, and Zizzo 
(2010) for a recent application to experimental economics. 
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forming inflation expectations and that those memories are largely inaccurate and 
thus induce large errors in expectations.
Our findings provide useful lessons for macroeconomic theory. The idea that 
monetary policy can have real effects due to information frictions dates back to 
Phelps (1969) and Lucas (1972). More recently, Mankiw and Reis (2002) show 
how the New Keynesian Phillips curve can be the product of sticky information. The 
policy prescriptions depend on how we model information frictions, but there is no 
consensus about which model is best (Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2012). Our evi-
dence suggests that, in addition to rational inattention models, the literature should 
incorporate cognitive limitations.5
Our findings are also related to recent debates about central bank transparency. 
Some authors argue that information disclosure can enhance welfare (Hellwig 
2005), and others argue that it can reduce welfare (Morris and Shin 2002). Our 
findings suggest that, even when the statistics are publicly and readily available, 
households instead use less accurate private information. This implies that, in 
addition to the dissemination of aggregate statistics, central banks may have an 
additional policy margin in terms of communicating how objective, precise, and 
representative these statistics are. For example, the European Central Bank and 
the French statistical agency have made notable efforts to create online tools to 
convey this information, including the way it is collected and processed, in a user 
friendly way.6 Central banks interested in affecting individual expectations could 
also disseminate more relatable information, such as the price changes of specific 
products. All these efforts may help central banks increase the speed with which 
individuals react to monetary policy and help households make better financial 
decisions (Armantier et al. 2013).7
Our paper belongs to a literature that tries to understand the formation of house-
hold inflation expectations. Some studies have measured the role of inflation statis-
tics, exploiting media coverage of statistics (Lamla and Lein 2008, Badarinza and 
Buchmann 2009, and Dräger 2011), the publication of official statistics (Carrillo 
and Emran 2012), and information provision experiments (Roos and Schmidt 2012, 
Armantier et al. 2016). Other studies have looked at the role of personal experi-
ences. For instance, evidence suggets that individuals use information from their 
own price memories (Bates and Gabor 1986; Bruine de Bruin, van der Klaauw, and 
Topa 2011; and Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2015) and that individuals place exces-
sive weight on information about past inflation levels that they personally experi-
enced (Malmendier and Nagel 2016).
Thus far, the literature has been unable to distinguish between different sources of 
information friction (Ranyard et al. 2008). Some evidence shows that individuals fail 
to incorporate all available information. Some authors interpret this as evidence of 
5 The literature on memory in psychology and behavioral economics provides useful models for these cognitive 
limitations. See, for example, Mullainathan (2002) and Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010). 
6 See http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/educational/hicp/html/index.en.html and http://www.insee.fr/en/
indicateurs/indic_cons/sip/sip.htm, respectively. 
7 The distribution of the bias is relevant as well. If poorer and less educated consumers had larger biases, as 
observed in many datasets, then correcting their biases may reduce these consumers’ relative disadvantages. 
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rational inattention (e.g., Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers 2004),8 while other authors 
interpret this as evidence of irrational inattention (e.g., Bruine de Bruin, van der 
Klaauw, and Topa 2011; Malmendier and Nagel 2016). Our contribution to this 
literature is to design experiments that disentangle these two sources of informa-
tion frictions, rational inattention and irrational learning, by exploiting variations 
in stakes (i.e., contexts of high versus low inflation) and sources of information 
(i.e., inflation statistics versus supermarket prices).
Methodologically, our paper is related to a recent subset of the literature that 
employs survey experiments to investigate household inflation expectations. For 
example, studies by Roos and Schmidt (2012) and Armantier et al. (2016) exam-
ine how individuals react to information about US inflation statistics by adjusting 
their reported inflation perceptions. Bruine de Bruin, van der Klaauw, and Topa 
(2011) show that subjects who are asked to think about products with extreme price 
changes tend to report high inflation expectations. We contribute to this literature by 
extending these methods to answer novel questions about the sources of informa-
tion frictions. Additionally, we make several methodological contributions, such as 
disentangling genuine from spurious learning and combining survey with adminis-
trative data to study how individuals learn about supermarket prices.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the general experimental 
design. Section II presents evidence from a series of online experiments conducted 
in the United States and Argentina. Section III presents evidence from the consumer 
intercept survey experiment. Section IV concludes.
I. Experimental Design
A. Structure of the Survey Experiments
In this section, we describe the experimental framework for the empirical analy-
sis in this paper. This framework builds upon several previous experimental studies 
(e.g., Bruine de Bruin, van der Klaauw, and Topa 2011; Roos and Schmidt 2012; and 
Armantier et al. 2016), and it introduces innovations aimed at testing new hypothe-
ses and addressing the concern of spurious learning.
The basic structure of the survey experiments is as follows:
•	 Eliciting	subjects’	inflation	perceptions	(i.e., the perception of the annual infla-
tion rate over the previous 12 months). This constitutes the individual’s prior 
belief ( π i, t 0 in the model in the following section).
•	 Providing	the	subject	with	information	related	to	the	inflation	rate	over	the	pre-
vious 12 months, which constitutes the signal ( π i, t T ). In the case of the control 
group with no information provision, there is no signal. The different pieces of 
information provided to the subjects is described in the following subsection.
8 For example, Demery and Duck (2007) argue that individuals may optimally decide to use solely information 
they receive as a byproduct of their economic activity, rather than complementing that information with official 
statistics.
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•	 Eliciting	subjects’	expectations	about	inflation	(i.e., the expected annual infla-
tion rate over the following 12 months,  π i, t+1 ) and other nominal variables (e.g., 
the nominal interest rate,  i i, t+1 ). These expectations may be elicited right after 
the information provision or several months later.
The main analysis consists of measuring how the information provided to individu-
als changes their expectations about the future. When eliciting inflation perceptions 
and expectations, we always refer to the general price level rather than to the prices 
of the goods purchased by the respondent.9 We did not provide any incentives (e.g., 
prizes for guessing the right figures). However, as shown by Armantier et al. (2011), 
there is a significant correlation between incentivized and non-incentivized beliefs 
on inflation expectations.
B. Treatment Arms
After eliciting past inflation perceptions, subjects were randomly assigned to 
either a control group (with no information) or one of four treatment arms. This 
section describes these treatment arms.
The snapshots of the informational treatments and the survey questions are 
shown in the online questionnaire Appendix. Figure 1 shows the samples of the 
information treatments in the US online experiment.10 Our first treatment arm, 
shown in panel C of Figure 1, aimed to capture how individuals incorporate infor-
mation from inflation statistics. This Statistics (1.5 percent) treatment consisted of 
a table with the most recent statistics about annual inflation at the time of the sur-
vey, and it was preceded by an explanation of what they were intended to measure 
(see the note accompanying Figure 1 for the exact wording). The average of the 
three statistics indicated an annual average inflation rate of 1.5 percent, which was 
also displayed on the table.
Our second treatment arm was designed to capture the degree to which individu-
als use the information related to their everyday experience when forming inflation 
expectations, even if that information is not as representative and precise as aggre-
gate inflation statistics. The Products treatment arm, illustrated in panels A and B of 
Figure 1, presented respondents with a table containing the prices of six products at 
the time of the survey and one year earlier, as well as the price change (in percentage 
points) for each product and the average percentage price change for all products 
presented in the table, also for the period from August 1, 2012 to August 1, 2013. 
This table was preceded by an explanatory paragraph (see the note accompanying 
Figure 1 for the exact wording).
9 Specifically, for the US online experiment, we asked participants the following two questions, taken directly 
from the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers: “During the next 12 months, do you think that prices in 
general will go up, or go down, or stay where they are now?” with three options: “Go up,” “Stay the same,” and “Go 
down.” We then asked, “By about what percentage do you expect prices to change, on average, during the next 12 
months?” with an open numerical answer. For the Argentina online experiment, we opted to repeat the format of the 
question that had been asked in previous rounds of the opinion poll: “What do you think will be the annual inflation 
rate for the following 12 months?” (see the Appendix for exact wording in Spanish). 
10 Please find the corresponding figure for the Argentina online experiment in the online Appendix.
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The products were selected from six broad types of goods (infant formula, bread, 
pasta and noodle-related products, cereals, sodas, and shampoos and related prod-
ucts). An algorithm selected the products in the specific tables so that the average 
price changes stayed between −2 percent to 7 percent in 1 percentage point incre-
ments for a total of ten tables. The algorithm populated the tables with products of 
different average price changes. It also verified that other characteristics of the tables 
were roughly constant, based on the availability of price histories for thousands of 
products and on detailed information about product characteristics. For instance, 
every table had one product from each of the six categories of goods, and the goods 
within each category had similar initial prices across tables (the algorithm selects 
different brands within product categories, because each brand experiences different 
price changes). This ensured that the initial price level and the representativeness of 
the products remained broadly comparable across tables. The information provided 
Figure 1. Example of Products (various levels), statistics (1.5 percent), and HyPotHetical (10 percent) 
Treatments, US Online Experiment
Notes: The Statistics treatment was preceded by the following text: “Before answering, please look at the table 
below. The table shows indicators used by different government agencies to measure the annual inflation rate—that 
is, how much prices have changed on average over the last 12 months, from August 1, 2012 to August 1, 2013.” The 
Products treatments were preceded by the following text: “Before answering, please look at the table below. The 
table shows the price of each listed product on August 1, 2012 and on August 1, 2013 (that is, one year later). These 
prices were taken from the same branch of a large supermarket chain. The six products that appear in this table were 
randomly selected from a database containing hundreds of products.” The Hypothetical treatment was preceded by 
the following text: “In this survey we ask you questions about how “prices in general” evolve over time. The fol-
lowing question is meant to assess how comfortable you are with the way these questions are phrased. Please con-
sider the following prices of a hypothetical product at two different moments” and, immediately afterward, included 
the following question: “What is the approximate price change of this product over this period? Please do not use a 
calculator, pen, or pencil to calculate the exact figure. We want your best guess from eye-balling these prices.” See 
the questionnaire Appendix for more details. The online Appendix presents examples of the Products treatment for 
the Argentina Online Experiment.
Source: 1 Bureau of Labor Statistics; 2 Bureau of Economic Analysis; 3 Bureau of Economic Analysis
Panel A. Products (−2%) Panel B. Products (2%)




in prices Price on January 1, 2012:
Price on January 1, 2013:
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was entirely truthful, and a note accompanying the table indicated that the products 
were taken from a large database with information from an existing branch of a large 
US supermarket chain.11 There was no indication that the products in the table or the 
average of price changes were representative or that they reflected actual inflation 
levels. Respondents in this treatment arm were randomly assigned one of the ten 
tables with different average price changes, which we indicate in parentheses after 
the Products treatment arm name in the rest of this paper. Panels A and B in Figure 1 
illustrate the −2 percent and 2 percent cases, respectively.
An additional treatment arm consisted of a combination of the previous 
two pieces of information (i.e., the respondent was shown the table with infla-
tion statistics and one of the tables with prices for specific products). This is the 
Statistics (1.5 percent) + Products treatment arm, which was designed to test 
whether the tables with specific prices induced learning over and above the informa-
tion conveyed by the inflation statistics.
Finally, we included a fourth treatment arm to gauge the degree of spurious learn-
ing, which we call the Hypothetical treatment. The respondents were asked to “eye-
ball” the price change of a product over one year. We phrased the question in terms 
of the need to assess how comfortable the respondent was with questions about price 
changes. The table we provided contained only two prices at two points in time 
(January 1, 2012 and January 1, 2013) without specifying the product. The price of 
the hypothetical product changed from $9.99 to $10.99, a price increase of about 
10 percent (panel D of Figure 1). If the number we introduced in the information 
provision stage, which was unrelated to reality, had any impact on stated inflation 
expectations, it would comprise evidence of spurious learning.
C. Estimating Learning rates
In the following sections, we present some reduced form evidence on how indi-
viduals react to randomly assigned information. We compare the raw distribution 
of inflation expectations (e.g., by means of a histogram) across individuals who 
were assigned to different treatment groups. The main advantage of this model-free 
approach is its transparency. Additionally, in this section we introduce a simple 
learning model that can summarize reactions to the information in a single parame-
ter. These reactions can then be easily compared between experimental samples and 
information treatments.
We denote an individual’s perception of the annual inflation rate over the previous 
12 months as  π i, t . In turn,  π i, t+1 represents the individual’s expected annual inflation 
rate over the following 12 months. Individuals use information about (perceived) 
past inflation to form their expectations about future inflation:
(1)  π i, t+1 = f  ( π i, t ) .
11 The data were scraped from the websites of some of the largest supermarkets in the United States and 
Argentina as part of the Billion Prices Project at MIT. See Cavallo (2013) for details. 
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Note that this is a reduced form model of expectations: this forecasting rule could 
represent an agent with rational expectations, an agent with adaptive expectations, 
or some other model of expectation formation.12 None of the experiments that we 
conduct intend to distinguish between these different interpretations, because we 
want to estimate a model of learning, not a model of expectation formation.
We consider a linear specification for  f ( · ) :
(2)  π i, t+1 = μ + β  π i, t ,
where  β is the degree of pass-through from inflation perceptions to inflation expecta-
tions. A simple forward-looking model like this seems to be a good strategy from the 
perspective of forming inflation expectations. For example, Atkeson and Ohanian 
(2001) report that, since 1984, the one-year-ahead inflation forecast of professionals 
in the United States has been no better than the “native” forecast of the inflation rate 
over the previous year.
Indeed, this linear specification fits the expectations and perceptions data very well 
(Jonung 1981). For example, Figure 2 shows a robust linear relationship between 
perceived past inflation and expected future inflation for our online samples: with 
a regression coefficient of 0.782 in the United States (panel A) and a regression 
coefficient of 0.883 in Argentina (panel B).13 Moreover, a great deal of the varia-
tion in inflation expectations can be explained by variation in inflation perceptions: 
in our US sample, 29 percent of the variation in inflation expectations is due to 
variation in inflation perceptions, whereas the equivalent figure for our Argentine 
sample is 60 percent. In other words, a significant fraction of the disagreement about 
future inflation seems to result from a disagreement about past inflation (see also 
Blanchflower and MacCoille 2009). Thus, to understand the biases and dispersion 
in future inflation expectations, we must understand the biases and dispersion in 
perceptions about past inflation.
The experiments we carried out consist of providing information related to past 
inflation. Let  π i, t 0 denote perceptions prior to the acquisition of new information, 
and let  π i, t T denote the signal from the information provided in the experiment. Any 
learning process (i.e., how individuals combine their prior knowledge and the new 
information to form their perceptions) can be represented by the following reduced 
form equation:
(3)  π i, t = g ( π i, t 0 ,  π i, t T ) .
There are several plausible functional forms for  g ( · ) . A simple and parsimo-
nious alternative is to assume a Bayesian learning model with Gaussian distribu-
tion. Under this model, the prior belief is normally distributed with mean  π i, t 0 and 
12 The fact that individuals use information about the past to estimate future inflation may be suggestive of the 
models of adaptive learning (Sargent 1993). However, the use of inflation perceptions to assess future inflation may 
also be consistent with rational expectations: e.g., some rational expectation models predict that inflation expecta-
tions follow an AR(1) process (Barr and Campbell 1997). 
13 These data are for subjects in the control group (i.e., those who were not provided any information about 
inflation). 
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 standard deviation  σ i, t 0 (indeed, the distribution of reported inflation perceptions and 
expectation is distributed approximately normal). The individual is presented with 
a signal about average inflation,  π i, t T , which can be interpreted as the price change 
for one product randomly drawn from the universe of products. The population of 
price changes for all possible products follows a normal distribution with mean 
π i, t and standard deviation  σ i, t T (this functional form is also roughly consistent with 
the actual distribution of price changes). By construction,  π i, t TruE is the actual infla-
tion level (i.e., the average of price changes for all products). The precision of the 
signal is given by the inverse of  σ i, t T , which is assumed to be known. Under these 
assumptions, the posterior belief is distributed normally with the following mean 
and variance:
(4)  π i,t =  
 ( 1 ___  σ i,t 0 ) 
2
 
  ________________  
  ( 1 ___  σ i,t 0 ) 
2
 +  ( 1 ___  σ i,t T ) 
2
 
π i,t 0 +  
 ( 1 ___  σ i,t T ) 
2
 
  ________________  
  ( 1 ___  σ i,t 0 ) 
2
 +  ( 1 ___  σ i,t T ) 
2
 
π i,t T , 
  σ i,t =  √ ____________   ( σ i,t 0 ·  σ i,t T ) 2   _____________ ( σ i,t 0 ) 2 +  ( σ i,t T ) 2  .
That is, individuals update their perceptions based on an average between their 
prior beliefs and the realized signal:
(5)  π i, t = (1 −  α i, t )  π i, t 0 +  α i, t  π i, t T ,
where  α i, t , the weight assigned to the new information, decreases with the accu-
racy of the prior belief 1/ σ i,t 0 and increases with the accuracy of the signal 1/ σ i,t T . 
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Figure 2. Past Inflation Perceptions versus Future Inflation Expectations,  
US and Argentina Online Experiments
notes: The total number of observations are 783 for the United States and 567 for Argentina’s sample II. These 
observations correspond to the control group only in both cases. The figures are binned scatter plots. The darker 
markers represent the average inflation expectations for quantiles of inflation perceptions (12 quantiles for the 
United States and 24 for Argentina). The solid line represents the 45 degree line.
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If  σ i, t 0 and  σ i, t T are constant across individuals, then  α is also constant across indi-
viduals. Replacing this expression in equation (2), the linearized version of the 
 forward-looking equation, results in the following expression:
(6)  π i, t+1 =  γ 0 +  γ 1  ⏟β  π i, t 
0 +  γ 2  ⏟αβ( π i, t 
T −  π i, t 0 ) +  ε i, t+1 .
Note that the three elements in regression equation  (6) are all observed in our exper-
imental data:  π i, t+1 is the respondent’s stated inflation expectation (posttreatment); π i, t 0 is the respondent’s stated past inflation perception (pretreatment); and  π i, t T − π i, t 0 is the difference between the signal provided in the informational treatment and 
the prior belief (defined as zero for the control group). Thus, we can regress  π i, t+1 
on  π i, t 0 and  π i, t T −  π i, t 0 to estimate  γ ˆ 1 and  γ ˆ 2 , and then use those parameters to estimate α ˆ and  β ˆ using the formulas  β ˆ =  γ ˆ 1 and  α ˆ =  γ ˆ 2 / γ ˆ 1 . We use the Delta Method to 
obtain the standard errors of  α ˆ =  γ ˆ 2 / γ ˆ 1 .14
The parameter  β represents the rate of pass-through from perceptions of past 
inflation to future inflation expectations. The parameter  α captures the weight that 
the individual assigns to the information provided in the experiment, relative to that 
individual’s prior belief. Intuitively, if the individual started with a prior belief of 
π i, t 0 and if the informational treatment provides a signal that inflation is  π i, t T , then 
the posterior belief can be expected to be between  π i, t 0 and  π i, t T , and the parameter  α 
reflects how much closer  π i, t is to  π i, t T relative to  π i, t 0 .
The following example illustrates the intuition behind our empirical model. Let 
us assume that, among individuals who receive no information from us, the correla-
tion between inflation perceptions and expectations is 0.5. That is, for each 1 percent 
increase in perceived past inflation, an individual believes that future inflation will 
be 0.5 percent higher. Now assume that we take a group of individuals who believed 
that past inflation was 10 percent, and we randomly provide some of them a sig-
nal that past inflation was 20 percent. If, relative to the control group, individuals 
who received the signal believe that future inflation is going to be 1 percent higher, 
then the information led them to believe that past inflation was 2 percent higher 
(i.e., 1/0.5). In other words, the signal that past inflation was actually 20 percent 
increased their beliefs about past inflation from 10 percent to 12 percent. This indi-
cates that, in forming their posterior beliefs, they assigned a 0.8 weight to the prior 
belief of 10 percent and a 0.2 weight to the signal of 20 percent (i.e., 12% = 0.8 
 × 10% + 0.2  × 20%).
This model of Bayesian learning makes several additional predictions that can 
be directly tested with the data. For instance, this model predicts that confidence in 
the posterior belief,  σ i, t , should be higher for individuals who were provided with 
relevant information than for those who did not receive any information. We present 
results for these tests in the results section and in the Appendix.15
14 One assumption is that the above OLS regression yields an unbiased estimate for  β . Because  π i, t 0 is not ran-
domized, at least in principle,  β could suffer from omitted variable bias, which in turn could bias the estimation of  α . 
15 Armantier et al. (2016) also provide related tests of Bayesian learning in the context of household perceptions 
about inflation. 
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D. Disentangling Genuine from Spurious Learning
A potential issue with our results is that, even if we find that the information 
provided has an effect on stated inflation expectations, individuals’ reactions to this 
information may be spurious. In this section, we present a framework to quantify 
how much of  α responds to genuine learning and how much to spurious learning.
Our first (and preferred) strategy consists of using data on the evolution of expec-
tations obtained through follow-up surveys taken months after the original informa-
tion provision. Numerical anchoring is, by definition, very short-lived, so we do not 
expect it to explain effects on beliefs measured months after the information was 
provided. Regarding interviewer pressure, it is most likely that subjects will not 
remember the information that was provided to them months ago, so they should not 
be subject to pressure to agree with the interviewer.
Let  π i, t+1  follow−up denote the inflation expectations elicited in a follow-up survey 
conducted months after the initial experiment, in which we did not provide any 
new information and we did not remind the subject about information provided in 
the past. Consider this new forward-looking equation:  π  i, t+1  follow−up =  μ Fu +  β Fu  π i, t , 
where  β Fu is the degree of pass-through from inflation perceptions, as stated in the 
original survey, to inflation expectations stated in the follow-up survey. The estimate 
of  β Fu should be lower than  β , because  β Fu is the product of  β (i.e., pass-through 
from perceptions to expectations) and the pass-through from inflation perceptions 
in the first survey to inflation perceptions in the second survey (which is expected to 
be lower than one because individuals should have acquired more information in the 
meantime). In other words, for this estimate, we do not need to assume that individ-
uals do not learn new information between the two surveys, because the parameter 
β Fu accounts for this assumption.
If we combine the new forward-looking equation with the learning equation (5), 
we obtain the following:
(7)  π  i, t+1 follow−up =  γ 0 +  γ 1  ⏟ β Fu 
 π i, t 0 +   γ 2  ⏟α β Fu 
 ( π i, t T −  π i, t 0 ) +  ε i, t+1 .
In other words, we can use the same estimation procedure with  π  i, t+1 follow−up instead 
of  π i, t+1 as the dependent variable. Intuitively, if in the original survey the information 
provided by the experimenter truly affected the individual’s posterior belief about 
past inflation, then (after properly accounting for the rate of information renewal) 
this effect should persist in beliefs elicited at future points in time. Because this new 
estimation strategy should remove spurious learning (at least to some degree), the 
ratio between the  α coefficient based on  π  i, t+1 follow−up and the  α coefficient based on π i, t+1 can provide an estimate of the share of learning that is genuine rather than 
spurious.
We can provide an intuitive explanation of what our estimate captures. Among 
individuals who did not receive any information from us, suppose that we observe 
that each extra percentage point in perceived inflation today translates, on average, 
to about 0.5 additional percentage points of inflation expectations two months from 
now. If an informational treatment truly convinced a subject today that inflation 
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expectations will be 1 percentage point higher, we should observe an increase in 
inflation expectations of 0.5 percentage points, as measured two months later. If, 
though, the information induced only a 0.25 increase in inflation expectations two 
months later, then we would conclude that half of the learning was genuine. If the 
information did not induce any changes in inflation expectations two months after 
the treatment, then all learning would be deemed spurious.
The second strategy is based on individuals’ perceptions and expectations regard-
ing other economic indicators that are closely related to inflation. In our experi-
ments, we collected information on perceptions about the expected nominal interest 
rate over the next 12 months, which, just like inflation expectations, was elicited 
after the experimental information provision. Let  i i, t+1 denote the expectation about 
the nominal annual interest rate. The new forward-looking equation is  i i, t+1 =  μ I + β I  π i, t , where  β I is the degree of pass-through from inflation perceptions to interest 
rate expectations. If we combine the new forward-looking equation with the learn-
ing equation (5), we obtain the following:
(8)  i i, t+1 =  γ 0 +  γ 1  ⏟ β I 
  π i, t 0 +  γ 2  ⏟α β I (
 π i, t T −  π i, t 0 ) +  ε i, t+1 .
Again, this corresponds to using  i i, t+1 instead of  π i, t+1 as the dependent variable 
in our learning regression. Comparing the estimated  α coefficients in the two spec-
ifications provides a second way to quantify genuine versus spurious learning. The 
intuition for this test is very similar to that of the first test. Assume that among indi-
viduals in the control group, respondents who report expecting a 1 percentage point 
increase in inflation also report a future nominal interest rate that is 0.3 percentage 
points higher. If an informational treatment truly convinces a subject that future 
inflation will be 1 percentage point higher, it should also convince that individual 
that the future nominal interest rate will be 0.3 percentage points higher. However, 
if the information induced only a spurious effect on inflation expectations, then it 
would have no impact on interest rate expectations (or any other nominal variables 
intrinsically related to inflation).
II. Results from Online Experiments in the United States and Argentina
A. Subject Pool and Descriptive Statistics
In the United States, we recruited subjects from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(AMT) online marketplace during September 2013. We followed several best prac-
tices for recruiting individuals for online surveys and experiments using AMT to 
ensure high quality responses (see, for instance, Crump, McDonnell, and Gureckis 
2013). In Argentina, a first sample was collected through an online survey of col-
lege graduates. The second, larger sample is based on an established public opinion 
research firm that carries out a quarterly online survey of adults in Argentina. See 
the online Appendix for further details about the samples.
According to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) reported by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), the annual inflation in the United States for the five years prior to 
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our study (2008–2012) was, on average, 1.8 percent. In the online survey, the mean 
for inflation perceptions was 5.07 percent. In the control group, the mean for infla-
tion expectations was 5.08 percent. In Argentina, the average rate for 2008–2012 
was also stable but around 22.5 percent. In the larger sample, the mean inflation 
perception was 27.8 percent, and the mean inflation expectation in the control group 
was 28.4 percent.
Our US sample is younger and more educated than the US average, while our 
Argentine sample is more educated than the country average (the online Appendix 
provides a comparison of characteristics with population averages). In any case, as 
shown in the online Appendix, the results are similar if we re-weight the observa-
tions to make them representative on observables. In turn, Figure 3, panel A, com-
pares the distribution of inflation expectations in our US online experiment (for the 
control group) to the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers. Besides orig-
inating in different samples, there are several methodological differences between 
the two survey questions capturing expected inflation. Despite these differences, the 
distribution of inflation expectations in the two samples are very similar. For exam-
ple, the median expectation is just 1 percentage point higher in our online sample 
(4 percent) than in the University of Michigan survey (3 percent), and the inter-
quartile range is just 1 percentage point wider in our sample (2 percent–6 percent, 
compared to 2 percent–5 percent).
Figure 3, panel B, provides a similar comparison for the Argentine data. In 
Argentina, there is no nationally representative survey equivalent to the Michigan’s 
Survey of Consumers or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Survey of 
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Figure 3. Comparison of Inflation Expectations between US and Argentina Online Experiment Samples 
and Third-Party Samples
notes: Both figures plot the distribution of inflation expectations for the following 12 months for each country 
according to two different sources. Panel A presents the distribution for the United States for the control group 
of our US online experiment sample (n = 697 September 2013 observations only) and for the University of 
Michigan’s Survey of Consumers (n = 468 September 2013 wave). Panel B presents the distribution of infla-
tion expectations for Argentina for the control group of our Argentina online experiment sample II (opinion poll, 
n = 567) and for the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella’s Encuesta de Percepciones de Inflacion (n = 1,878), both 
for April 2013.
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Consumer Expectations. Instead, Figure 3.b compares our Argentine sample to the 
Survey of Consumer Expectations conducted by the University Torcuato Di Tella. 
This survey is less comparable to our online survey for several reasons, one of which 
is because the language of the inflation expectation question is different. Despite 
these differences, the distribution of inflation expectation is roughly comparable 
across these two surveys.
In the United States, the final sample includes 3,945 individuals, with 783 in the 
control group, 807 in the Statistics (1.5 percent) treatment, 763 in the Products treat-
ment (10 tables with average price changes from −2 percent to 7 percent in 1 per-
centage point increments within this treatment), 804 in the Products + Statistics 
(1.5 percent) combined treatment (same 10 tables as above), and 788 in the 
Hypothetical treatment. In Argentina, the first sample yielded 691 observations, 182 
of which were assigned to the control, 161 to Statistics (24 percent),16 and 348 to 
the Products arm (with average price changes of 19 percent, 24 percent, and 29 per-
cent). The second sample yielded 3,653 subjects, with 567 subjects assigned to the 
control group and the rest to the Products arm (with average price changes ranging 
from 16 percent to 34 percent, in 1 percentage point increments).
B. rational Inattention Test
In this section, we discuss the rational inattention test, which relies on the com-
parison of learning rates between the United States and Argentina.
In the five years before our study (2008–2012), the annual inflation rate in the 
United States was stable and averaged 1.8 percent. The average rate in Argentina was 
also stable but around 22.5 percent. Thus, the cost of ignoring inflation in Argentina 
was substantially higher. For example, individuals must rely on good information on 
inflation prospects in drawing up contracts, because it is illegal to index such con-
tracts (labor, real estate, etc.), or rely on more stable foreign currencies.17 Opinion 
polls in Argentina at the time of the survey systematically indicated inflation as 
one of the population’s primary concerns.18 Inflation statistics were mentioned on 
offline and online news outlets on a regular basis, frequently making the front page 
of newspapers. According to the rational inattention model (Sims 2005, Veldkamp 
2011), individuals in Argentina should be more informed and consequently have 
stronger prior beliefs about past inflation than their US counterparts.
Figure 4 summarizes the reduced form evidence from the online experiment (see 
the online Appendix for more detailed outputs by different treatment arms). All pan-
els in this figure present the distribution of inflation expectations for two treatment 
arms, in which one arm is always the control group (the histograms accumulate the 
16 The value provided in the Statistics treatment arm (and reported therein) represents the average inflation 
estimates of private consultancies, research centers, and provincial public statistical agencies, as compiled and 
computed by opposition parties in the Argentine Congress since the intervention of the national statistical agency in 
Argentina in 2012 (Cavallo 2013). These are the statistics that individuals used on a regular basis (for more details, 
see Cavallo, Cruces, and Perez-Truglia 2016). 
17 See Cavallo, Cruces, and Perez-Truglia (2016) for more details on the Argentine macroeconomic and institu-
tional context at the time of our experiments. 
18 For our opinion poll sample, 40.7 percent of those in our control group selected inflation as one of the three 
main concerns for the country. 
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observations below −5 percent and above 15 percent in the extreme bars). Each 
panel in Figure 4 reports the results from an Epps–Singleton (ES) two-sample test 
using the empirical characteristic function, which is a version of the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test of equality of distributions that is valid for discrete data (Goerg and 
Kaiser 2009). All pairwise differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level, indicating that our experimental subjects significantly reacted to the inflation 
provided by us.
We start with the reduced form results for the United States. Figure 4, panel  AI 
presents the results for the Statistics (1.5 percent) treatment, which consisted of pro-
viding the respondent solely with a table of statistics about past inflation. According 
Panel A. United States
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Figure 4. Reduced Form Evidence: Rational Inattention Test, US and Argentina Online Experiments
notes: For panel A, we use the US online experiment sample, with 783 observations from the control group, 807 
from the Statistics (1.5 percent) treatment and 156 observations from the Products (2 percent) and Products (3 per-
cent) groups. For panel B, we use observations from the Argentina online experiment sample I, with 182 observa-
tions from the control group, 161 observations from the Statistics (24 percent) group, and 135 observations from 
the Products (24 percent) group. ES is the Epps–Singleton characteristic function test of equality of two distribu-
tions. The histograms are censored at −5 percent and 15 percent (inclusive) in panel A and at 5 percent and 55 per-
cent in panel B, but these bins represent the cumulative observations below the minimum and above the maximum 
for each country.
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to the Bayesian learning model, providing a signal about inflation should shift the 
distribution of inflation expectations (relative to the control group) towards the value 
of the signal, and it should produce a more concentrated distribution of expectations. 
Consistent with this prediction, this signal shifts the distribution of expectations 
towards 1.5 percent and makes the distribution of expectations less dispersed.
Figure 4, panel AII shows the effects of the Products (2 percent–3 percent) treat-
ments (the online Appendix shows the results for the rest of the Products groups). 
Consistent with the learning model, the signal that supermarket products increased 
2 percent–3 percent shifted inflation expectations towards this range and reduced the 
dispersion of expectations.
Turning to the reduced form results for Argentina, Figure 4, panels BI and BII 
present the results that are equivalent to those in Figure 4, panels AI and AII for the 
United States. The results in Argentina are qualitatively identical to those from the 
US experiment: providing a signal about inflation shifted the distribution of inflation 
expectations toward the value of the signal and led to a more concentrated distribu-
tion of expectations.
Although the effects of Statistics and Products information are qualitatively iden-
tical between the United States and Argentina, the rational inattention test relies 
on the quantitative comparison between the two countries. To facilitate such com-
parison, Table 1 presents the estimates of the learning rates, based on the Bayesian 
learning model introduced in Section IC, with results from the US experiment in 
panel A and results from the Argentine experiment in panel B. The table reports the 
values of  α and  β from equation (6). As previously discussed,  β can be interpreted 
as the degree of pass-through between perceptions of past inflation and expectations 
of future inflation, and  α as the weight placed by the respondents on the information 
provided in the experiment, with  (1 − α) being the weight placed on respondents’ 
prior belief about past inflation.
Column 1 from Table 1, panel A, reports that, in the United States, the learning rate 
( α ) in the Statistics (1.5 percent) treatment was 0.838 ( p-value < 0.01), whereas the 
weight given to its equivalent in the Products treatment was 0.689 ( p-value < 0.01). 
In other words, US subjects assigned a much greater weight to the information 
provided by the experiment than to their own prior belief. In turn, column 1 from 
Table 1, panel B, reports that, in the first Argentine sample, the estimated  α is 0.432 
( p-value < 0.01) for the Statistics treatment and 0.458 ( p-value < 0.01) for the 
Products treatment (column 2 shows a similar learning rate of 0.494 for the Products 
treatment in the second Argentine sample).19 Consistent with the prediction of the 
rational inattention model, US subjects revealed to be less informed about inflation, 
insofar as they assigned between 95 percent  (i.e.,  0.838 − 0.432 __________0.432 ) and 51 percent  (i.e.,  0.689 − 0.458 __________0.458 ) more weight to the information about statistics and supermarket 
products, relative to the Argentine subjects.20
19 The similar results for our college graduates sample I, all of whom had at least some basic training in econom-
ics and most of whom were professional economists or accountants, and our public opinion poll sample II suggest 
that economic literacy does not drive our findings (see also Burke and Manz 2011). 
20 This evidence is consistent with related evidence from Coibon, Gorodnichenko, and Kumar (2015) on firms’ 
lack of incentives to collect and process information on macroeconomic conditions (i.e., rational inattention) and 
its impact on firms’ inflation perceptions. 
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A potential confounding factor is the general loss of credibility of price data 
in Argentina after the manipulation of official statistics for the period 2007–2015 
(Cavallo 2013; Cavallo, Cruces, and Perez-Truglia 2016). Although we used an 
unofficial private sector indicator that was widely reported in the media and that 
became the de facto consensus figure for inflation during this period,21 economic 
21 This unofficial index was computed by members of the opposition in the Argentine Congress and was con-
structed as an average of private sector indicators. 
Table 1—Estimates of Learning Rates, Online Experiments
 π i, t+1  π i, t+1  π i, t+1  π  i, t+1  follow-up  i i, t+1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. united States
 β 0.757 0.817 0.814 0.438 0.291
(0.033) (0.058) (0.046) (0.055) (0.040)
 α -Products 0.689 0.449 0.697 0.336 0.499
(0.036) (0.050) (0.045) (0.150) (0.135)
 α -Statistics 0.838 0.283 0.799 0.360 0.314
(0.034) (0.063) (0.058) (0.138) (0.212)
 α -Hypothetical 0.232 0.215 −0.021 0.131
(0.027) (0.046) (0.092) (0.112)
Observations 3,141 1,587 1,073 1,073 3,141
Simultaneous treatments No Yes No No No
Panel B. Argentina
 β 1.138 0.902 0.963 0.754 0.155
(0.118) (0.042) (0.041) (0.086) (0.035)
 α -Products 0.458 0.494 0.456 0.208 0.468
(0.062) (0.027) (0.037) (0.094) (0.133)
 α -Statistics 0.432
(0.098)
Observations 691 3,653 1,320 1,320 3,373
Sample (experts, online) I II II II II
notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. The  α and  β coefficients 
are obtained from the regression given by equation (6), Section IC:  π i, t+1 =  γ 0 +  γ 1  π i, t 0 +  γ 2 ( π i, t T −  π i, t 0 ) , where  π i, t 0 is the respondent’s stated inflation perception,  π i, t T is the mean infla-
tion provided in the treatment, and  π i, t+1 is the posttreatment inflation expectation ( π i, t+1 ). 
We estimate  α ̂ and  β ̂ by running this linear regression and setting  γ ̂1 =  β ̂ and  α ̂ =   γ ̂1  __ γ ̂2 (standard errors of this ratio computed with the Delta Method). The parameter  β represents 
the rate of pass-through from perceptions of past inflation to future inflation expectations. 
The parameter  α captures the weight the individual assigns to the information provided in the 
experiment relative to her prior belief. In panel A, the results presented in column 2 represent 
the case of the Products + Statistics (1.5 percent) combined treatment, in which treated indi-
viduals received two pieces of information simultaneously. In both panels, the dependent vari-
able in columns 1 to 3 is inflation expectations (for the following 12 months) at the time of the 
original survey, with the sample restricted in column 3 to a subset of respondents who were 
reinterviewed after the original survey (two months later in the US online experiment and four 
months later in Argentina). The dependent variable in column 4 is inflation expectations (for 
the following 12 months) at the time of that follow-up interview. The dependent variable in col-
umn 5 is the expected interest rate (for the following 12 months) in the original survey. For the 
number of observations in each treatment group, please refer to Section IIIA.
Source: The source for the data in panel A is the US online experiment sample. The source for 
the data in panel B is the Argentina online samples I (college graduates) and II (opinion poll). 
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agents in Argentina might have become wary of all economic indicators. However, 
although this may explain why Argentines react less to inflation statistics than 
Americans, it does not explain why Argentines react less to supermarket prices than 
Americans. Another confounding factor could be that the difference in learning rates 
between countries could be explained by differences in characteristics of the subject 
pools. However, this explanation seems unlikely for at least two reasons. First, the 
observable characteristics (e.g., gender, age, education) are fairly similar across the 
two countries.22 Second, as shown in Section ID, the heterogeneity in learning rates 
by gender, education, and other characteristics are an order of magnitude smaller 
than the difference in learning rates across the two countries. A last confounding 
factor could be that differences in learning rates are not due to differences in infla-
tion levels but rather due to differences in the volatility of inflation across the two 
countries. This explanation seems unlikely for at least two reasons. First, inflation 
levels were relatively stable in both Argentina and the United States in the five years 
prior to our study. Second, even if Argentine inflation was deemed as more unstable, 
that would lead to an underestimation of our results, insofar as individuals should 
react more to new information in volatile contexts.
C. Irrational Learning Test
In this section, we test whether individuals use less accurate information on infla-
tion even when more accurate information is readily available.
Figure 5, panels C and D, present histograms corresponding to the effects of the 
treatments Products (0 percent) and Products (1 percent) (panel C), and Products 
(2 percent) and Products (3 percent) (panel D) on inflation expectations in the US 
online experiment sample. These figures illustrate how individuals react to different 
signals about supermarket prices. Relative to the control group, the treatment groups 
that received signals that supermarket prices had increased 0 percent and 1 percent 
are more likely to state inflation expectations in this range: the proportion stating 
0–1 percent more than doubles, compared to that of the control group (Figure 5, 
panel C). The reaction is similar to the signals of price increases of 2 percent and 
3 percent: this information increases the likelihood that individuals report inflation 
expectations close to the 2–3 percent range (Figure 5, panel D).
Figure 6, panel AI, provides further evidence about the effects of the Products 
treatment arm on inflation expectations in the United States. Relative to the control 
group, each bar represents the effect of each of the ten sub-treatments (with average 
annual price changes in the tables ranging from −2 percent to 10 percent on the 
horizontal axis) on average inflation expectations. This figure indicates that each 
percentage point increase in the average price change reported on the table of prod-
ucts increased the average inflation expectations for about 0.5 percentage points. 
Figure 6, panel BI shows that, as in Figure 6, panel AI for the United States, aver-
age inflation expectations in Argentina responded significantly to the average price 
changes shown in the table of supermarket products.
22 See the online Appendix for more details. 
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Note: ES test p−value: <0.01. Note: ES test p−value: <0.01.
Panel C. Control and Products (0% and 1%)
Panel E. Control and Statistics (1.5%) 
+ Products (0% and 1%)
Panel F. Control and Statistics (1.5%) 
+ Products (2% and 3%)




Products (0 & 1%)
Control
Products (2 & 3%)
Control
Hypothetical (10%)
Inflation expectations, next 12 months (percent) Inflation expectations, next 12 months (percent)
Note: ES test p−value: <0.01. Note: ES test p−value: <0.01.
Inflation expectations, next 12 months (percent) Inflation expectations, next 12 months (percent)
Note: ES test p−value: <0.01. Note: ES test p−value: <0.01.
Inflation expectations, next 12 months (percent) Inflation expectations, next 12 months (percent)
Control
Stats + Products (0 & 1%)
Control
Stats + Products (2 & 3%)
Figure 5. Reduced Form Evidence: Irrational Learning and Spurious Learning Tests,  
US Online Experiment
notes: The total number of observations for the US online experiment is 3,945, with 783 from the control group, 807 
from the Statistics (1.5 percent) treatment, 763 from the Products treatment (10 tables with average price changes from 
−2 percent to 7 percent in 1 percentage point increments within this treatment), 804 from the Products + Statistics 
(1.5 percent) combined treatment (same 10 tables as above), and 788 from the Hypothetical treatment. Panels C and E 
pool observations from the 0 percent and 1 percent average product price change tables for the Products (panel C) and 
Products + Statistics (1.5 percent) (panel E) treatments; panels D and F pool those from the 2 percent and 3 percent 
tables for the Products (panel D) and Products + Statistics (1.5 percent) (panel F) (see examples of these treatments 
in Figure1). ES is the Epps–Singleton characteristic function test of equality of two distributions.
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However, it is possible that individuals pay attention to those signals only 
because they do not observe their ideal signals, such as inflation statistics. In the 
treatment arm Statistics (1.5 percent) + Products, experimental subjects were pro-
vided with the table of statistics for past annual inflation averaging 1.5 percent and, 
 immediately afterward, they were presented with one of the Products tables with 
the price changes of supermarket products. Relative to the average price change 
from a random set of six products, inflation statistics are much more precisely esti-
mated. Thus, when confronted with these two pieces of information, we expect an 
economic professional to put all weight on the statistics information and ignore the 
supermarket prices information. In other words, the null hypothesis of rational learn-
ing predicts that the Statistics (1.5 percent) + Products (0 percent) and Statistics 
(1.5 percent) + Products (3 percent) treatments should have the same effect on 
Panel A. United States
AI. Effects on ination expectations AII. Effects on condence in ination expectations
(Higher is more condent)
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Figure 6. Effects of Products Treatments, US and Argentina Online Experiments
notes: The results in panel A were obtained from the US online experiment sample, with a total of 1,546 observa-
tions (783 from the control group and 763 from 10 variations of Products treatment). The results in panel B corre-
spond to the Argentina Online Experiment sample II, with a total of 3,686 observations (567 from the control group 
and 146–181 from each of the 19 Products treatment groups). Each bar represents the point estimate of the effect 
of the specific sub-treatment (average product price changes in the table presented) compared to the control group, 
with confidence intervals computed with robust standard errors. The confidence variable from panels AII and BII 
corresponds to the answer to a question about respondents’ self-confidence on their inflation expectations, with 
higher values denoting higher confidence, and standardized to have a standard deviation of 1.
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expectations. Figure 5, panels E and F, show the distribution of expectations under 
these two treatment arms (see the online Appendix for the rest of treatment arms). 
We can confidently reject the null hypothesis of rational learning: even though these 
individuals have the latest inflation statistics readily available to them, they assign a 
significant weight on much less reliable information on supermarket prices.
Column 2 of Table 1, panel A, shows the estimates of learning rates for the 
treatment arm Statistics (1.5 percent) + Products. When both statistics and super-
market prices are shown, the  α coefficient for the supermarket prices is 0.449 
( p-value < 0.01), even higher than the  α of 0.283 ( p-value < 0.01) for the statistics 
(the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level). These results sug-
gest that, whenever the two signals disagree with each other, individuals are more 
willing to incorporate signals closer to their everyday experience, such as a list of 
price changes for specific products, than signals derived from statistics.
The behavioral framework for thinking about subjective probabilities provides 
plausible explanations for this finding. A first interpretation has to do with the 
under-appreciation of the effects of sample sizes on the likelihood of different pro-
portions of a sample (Kahneman and Tversky 1972), also known as nonbelief in 
the law of large numbers. For instance, Benjamin, Moore, and Rabin (2013) show 
that averages estimated with sample sizes of 10 and 1,000 are perceived as equally 
precisely estimated. This could explain why individuals assign as much weight 
to the supermarket prices (based on fewer than 10 price changes) as they do to 
inflation statistics (based on thousands of price changes). A second interpretation 
relies on the concept of the availability heuristic, according to which individuals 
give more weight to information that is easier to recall. For instance, individuals 
incorrectly report that there are more words that start with the letter “k” than words 
with “k” as the third letter, presumably because it takes a more concentrated effort 
to think of any words in which “k” is the third letter (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). 
According to the availability heuristic, prices of products are more familiar and 
easier to recall than inflation statistics, which explains why individuals put so much 
weight on this information. Last, an alternative interpretation may be that, even in a 
developed country like the United States, some individuals distrust official statistics 
(see, Cavallo, Cruces, and Perez-Truglia 2016), or they may fail to comprehend how 
representative they are.
This evidence suggests that individuals use their own memories of price changes 
when forming inflation expectations. For example, Bruine de Bruin, van der Klaauw, 
and Topa (2011) present survey evidence that, when asked about inflation, a major-
ity of individuals report that they try to recall prices of specific products. At the end 
of our surveys, we also asked individuals about the information they tried to recall. 
In the control group of our US experiment sample, 64.4 percent of subjects reported 
trying to recall the prices of specific products, which was twice as much as those 
trying to recall inflation statistics. In Argentina, even though accurate inflation sta-
tistics are widely covered by the media, 74.9 percent of respondents reported trying 
to recall prices of specific products when asked about past inflation.
We tested more directly the hypothesis that individuals use their price memories 
in forming inflation expectations. Furthermore, we assessed how misleading the use 
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of price memories may be, which depends on the accuracy of these memories. These 
additional hypotheses required more detailed information about the consumer expe-
rience of the individuals, which is difficult to collect in an online survey. To explore 
these hypotheses further, we conducted an “offline” survey experiment with super-
market customers, which is presented and discussed in Section III.
D. Spurious Learning Test
In this section, we measure the extent to which the learning induced by our exper-
imental setup is spurious. To illustrate this concern, we included a treatment arm in 
which, with the excuse of a numerical literacy question, respondents were provided 
information on the current and past prices of a fictitious product, with an implied 
price change of about 10 percent. Under the hypothesis of spurious learning, indi-
viduals being asked to “eyeball” this 10 percent price change would be more likely 
to anchor their inflation expectations around 10 percent. Figure 5, panel B, com-
pares the distribution of inflation expectations between the control group and the 
Hypothetical treatment group in the US sample. Consistent with the hypothesis 
of spurious learning, the fictitious signal of a 10 percent price change increased 
the density around the 10 percent range of inflation expectations (the ES test indi-
cates a statistically significant difference in the distribution of inflation expectations 
between these two groups). For instance, respondents in the Hypothetical treat-
ment arm were 4.8 percentage points more likely than those in the control group to 
state that their inflation expectations for the following year were exactly 10 percent 
( p-value < 0.01).
Column 1 of Table 1, panel A, reports the implied learning rate from the Hypothetical 
treatment. The corresponding  α is 0.232 and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. Though significant, this rate is economically less significant when compared to 
the learning rates for the other informational treatments. The effect of this treatment 
may be attributable to unconscious numerical anchoring. Alternatively, this evidence 
may reveal that some individuals are so uninformed about inflation that they are even 
willing to use inflation figures from a hypothetical exercise as a benchmark. In any 
case, the evidence suggests the presence of some degree of spurious learning.
It is important to note that we compared individuals who were shown the finan-
cial literacy questions (regardless of what they answered) versus individuals who 
were not asked that question. Because we randomized who sees the financial liter-
acy question, this variation is exogenous. Although the correct answer to the finan-
cial literacy question was 10 percent, some individuals did not respond correctly 
(21 percent, to be precise). This led to an underestimation of spurious learning (i.e., 
if individuals responded some value X percent different from 10 percent, then we 
should have observed anchoring of inflation expectations around X percent rather 
than around 10 percent).23
23 We could see whether, relative to the control group, individuals responding X percent to the finan-
cial literacy question tend to anchor their inflation expectations around X percent for each possible value of 
X = {1%, 5%, 10%, 100%}. However, we refrain from making this comparison, because the responses to the finan-
cial literacy questions were not randomized and thus are most likely endogenous. 
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The first methodology to filter out spurious learning consists of estimating the 
learning model using inflation expectations in the follow-up survey. We used data 
on a subsample of 1,073 subjects who were reinterviewed two months after the 
original online experiment. This subsample was asked again about their inflation 
expectations, but they were not subjected to any type of new informational treatment 
or reminded of previous informational treatments. Column 3 of Table 1, panel A, 
presents the results of the basic regression with inflation expectations in the original 
survey as the dependent variable, but only for the subsample of those who later par-
ticipated in our follow-up survey in the United States. The  β and  α coefficients are 
similar to those presented in column 1 for the full sample.
Column 4 of Table 1, panel A, presents the regression for the same follow-up 
subsample but with inflation expectations as reported in the follow-up survey as the 
dependent variable. The  β coefficient is now substantially lower, falling from 0.814 
in column 3 to 0.438 in column 4. This result is consistent with our learning model, 
because the  β coefficient is the product of two terms: the pass-through from percep-
tions to expectations and the pass-through from inflation perceptions in the original 
survey to inflation perceptions in the follow-up survey. The  α coefficients of 0.360 
for the Statistics treatment and of 0.336 for the Products treatment are both statisti-
cally significant (at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively). However, they 
are about half as large as the coefficients of 0.799 and 0.697 from column 3. These 
estimates suggest that between 45 percent  (i.e.,  0.360 _____0.799) and 48 percent  (i.e.,  0.336 _____0.697) 
of the effect of the information provided can be attributed to genuine, rather than 
spurious, learning. Notably, the  α coefficient for the Hypothetical treatment in the 
follow-up results in column 4 is close to zero and statistically insignificant, in con-
trast to the small but positive and significant effect in column 3. This evidence sug-
gests that our methodology may have successfully filtered out the spurious learning.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1, panel B, reproduce the above results but for the 
Argentine sample instead of the US sample. A subsample of 1,320 of the subjects 
from the Argentine opinion poll sample were reinterviewed four months after the 
original survey.24 As in the case of the United States, the  β coefficient is lower for 
the follow-up regression, falling from 0.963 in column 3 to 0.754 in column 4.25 The 
α coefficient of 0.208 is statistically significant, but only half as large as the coeffi-
cient in column 3, indicating that about 45.6 percent  (i.e.,  0.208 _____0.456) of the effect of the 
information provided can be attributed to genuine, rather than spurious, learning. 
This reinforces the findings of the US online experiment, which showed a propor-
tion of genuine learning of about 45 percent in the context of a similar follow-up 
survey.
The second methodology for filtering out spurious learning consists of measuring 
learning rates based on the indirect effect of the information provided on the expected 
24 There was no significant difference in the probability of participating in the follow-up sample between the 
treatment and the control groups. 
25 Comparing the  β coefficient between the follow-up and the original samples provides a measure of the per-
sistence of beliefs. This evidence suggests that expectations are more persistent in Argentina than in the United 
States; that is, the  β for the follow-up survey is only 53.8 percent of the same coefficient in the original survey in the 
United States (0.438 and 0.814, Table 1), while in Argentina the corresponding proportion is 78.2 percent (0.754 
and 0.963, Table 1). 
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nominal interest rate. In the US sample, we report results from this exercise in col-
umn 5 of Table 1, where the dependent variable is an individual’s expectation for 
the nominal interest rates for the following 12 months. The  β coefficient indicates 
that for each additional percentage point in expected inflation, on average, subjects 
believed that the nominal interest rate would be about 0.3 percentage points higher. 
This is consistent with Behrend (1977), who presents evidence that individuals have 
a significant amount of useful understanding of the link between inflation and other 
economic outcomes, such as the nominal exchange rate. The estimated  α are 0.314 
for the Statistics treatment (borderline insignificant at the 10 percent level) and 0.499 
for the Products treatment (significant at the 1 percent level). When these parameters 
are compared to those presented in column 1, they suggest that between 37.5 percent 
(i.e.,  0.314 _____0.838) and 72.5 percent  (i.e.,  0.499 _____0.689) of the learning is genuine. The average 
between these two figures, 55 percent, is close to the corresponding share of genuine 
learning inferred from the follow-up survey (46.6 percent). That is, both of these 
methodologies provide similar estimates of the degree of spurious learning. The 
results in column 5 indicate that the Hypothetical treatment arm did not have a sig-
nificant effect on individuals’ expected interest rates. This, again, can be interpreted 
as evidence that this methodology effectively weeds out spurious learning.
Column 5 of Table 1, panel B, reproduces the specification from column 5 of 
Table 1, panel A, but for Argentina instead of the United States. In this case, the  α 
coefficient of 0.468 is close to the baseline value from column 2 of Table 1, panel B 
(0.494). This estimate suggests that 95 percent  (i.e.,  0.468 _____0.494) of learning is genuine. 
However, this estimate is less precisely estimated, and we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that only 50 percent of the learning is genuine.
The results for the nominal interest rate also support our findings in a more gen-
eral way. Our survey questions always refer to inflation expectations in the sense of 
changes in the average general price level. However, it may be argued that individ-
uals may mistakenly respond as if we asked about their own idiosyncratic inflation 
(i.e., the price change of their own consumption basket).26 The results described in 
this paragraph show that this cannot be the case: changes in inflation expectations 
affect expectations about nominal variables, like the interest rate (and the exchange 
rate in the Argentine case, as discussed in the online Appendix), which should not be 
affected if individuals consider their own idiosyncratic experiences.
In sum, despite a significant level of spurious learning, about half of it is still 
genuine. More important, once we account for spurious learning, the main results 
still hold (e.g., it is still true that the learning rate in Argentina is substantially lower 
than that in the United States).
Additionally, to help establish the validity of the estimation of the learning rates, 
we test some auxiliary predictions of the Bayesian model. One prediction yielded 
by this model is that providing relevant information will increase the accuracy of 
the posterior belief. We test this hypothesis with our data, using the respondents’ 
self-reported confidence in their own inflation expectations on a scale from “very 
26 Indeed, Armantier et al. (2016) find that information about food prices causes consumers to update expecta-
tions more for their own basket inflation rate but less for their rate of inflation. 
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sure” to “very unsure.” Higher values of this confidence variable indicate higher 
confidence, and this variable is standardized to have a standard deviation of 1. In 
the United States, relative to the control group, the Statistics (1.5 percent) treatment 
increases confidence by 0.324 ( p-value < 0.01), the Products treatments increases 
confidence by 0.226 ( p-value < 0.01), the combined Products + Statistics (1.5 per-
cent) increases confidence by 0.368, and the Hypothetical treatment increases confi-
dence by a nonsignificant 0.032 ( p-value of 0.54). This pattern of results indicates a 
larger increase in confidence as we provide more factual information to our subjects. 
There is no change when we provide only the (nonfactual) Hypothetical treatment. 
Similarly, in Argentina’s sample I, relative to the control group, the Statistics (24 per-
cent) treatment increased standardized confidence by 0.197 ( p-value of 0.07), and 
the combined Products treatments increased confidence by 0.152 ( p-value of 0.09); 
whereas for sample II, the combined Products treatments increased confidence by 
0.360 ( p-value < 0.01) compared to that of the control group.
The Bayesian model also predicts that all signals from the same source should 
be equally informative to respondents, regardless of their value. In terms of the 
sub-treatments, Figure 6, panel AII, compares the impact of each level of price 
changes on the confidence in inflation expectations for the Products treatment arm 
in the United States. The evidence is consistent with this prediction, although we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that all positive signals (1 percent–7 percent) have the 
same effect on confidence ( p-value of 0.77), and we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that all non-positive signals (−2 percent, −1 percent, and 0 percent) have the same 
effect on confidence ( p-value of 0.83). We can, however, reject the hypothesis that 
positive and negative signals have the same effect on confidence ( p-value < 0.01), 
which suggests that individuals might be less prone to incorporate information 
about price decreases than about price increases. Figure 6, panel BII, reproduces 
the analysis of Figure 6, panel AII, for the Argentine experiment (sample II). The 
results suggest that, consistent with the Bayesian model, all these different signals 
led to the same gain in confidence about the posterior belief: we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that all signals have the same effect on posterior confidence 
( p-value of 0.73).
Another prediction of the Bayesian model is that the strength of the reaction 
to new information should depend on the strength of the prior. We can test this 
hypothesis using the subjective measure of confidence in the prior belief. Figure 7, 
panel A, presents the value of the  α coefficient corresponding to the reaction to the 
Products treatment, split by individuals with “High Confidence” and with “Low 
Confidence” in their stated inflation perceptions (United States corresponds to panel 
A and Argentina to panel B). The “High Confidence” group corresponds to those 
who answered “Sure” or “Very Sure” when asked about their confidence on their 
inflation perceptions, and the “Low Confidence” group corresponds to those who 
replied “Somewhat Sure,” “Unsure,” or “Very Unsure.” As predicted, in both coun-
tries the learning rates as captured by the  α coefficient are higher (i.e., individuals 
react more to the new information) for those with lower levels of confidence in their 
prior beliefs about inflation. In the US sample, the learning rate is 0.75 for “Low 
Confidence” and 0.58 for “High Confidence,” with a statistically significant differ-
ence ( p-value 0.03). In Argentina, the learning rate is 0.62 for “Low Confidence” 
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and 0.41 for “High Confidence,” also with a statistically significant difference 
between the two coefficients ( p-value < 0.01).
As a final robustness check, we measured the heterogeneity in learning rates with 
respect to individual demographic characteristics and compared those results with 
the findings reported in other papers about the heterogeneity of biases in expected 
inflation. Figure 7 presents this heterogeneity by computing the learning rates for 
different subgroups of the population (panel A for the United States and panel B for 
Argentina). Overall, the direction of the effects is identical across the two countries, 
with learning rates being lower for male, educated, and older individuals, although 
the differences tend to be more pronounced in Argentina than in the United States 
in terms of economic and statistical significance.27 This heterogeneity in learning 
rates is consistent with the evidence discussed in existing literature, for example, 
showing that female, less educated, and younger individuals from the United States 
tend to be less informed about inflation and have more biased inflation expectations 
(Bruine de Bruin, van der Klaauw, and Topa 2011; Malmendier and Nagel 2016; 
and Armantier et al. 2016).
27 Females have larger learning rates than males: 0.719 for females compared to 0.702 for males in the 
United States ( p-value of the difference = 0.81), and 0.519 compared to 0.432 in Argentina ( p-value = 0.07). 
Individuals with a college degree sometimes have lower learning rates than individuals without such degree: 0.715 
for college graduates compared to 0.716 for nongraduates for the United States ( p-value = 0.99), and 0.4 com-
pared to 0.535 for Argentina ( p-value < 0.01). Older subjects (those older than 35 years old) have lower learning 
rates than their younger counterparts: 0.586 for the older compared to 0.750 for the younger for the United States 
( p-value = 0.03), and 0.469 compared to 0.535 for Argentina ( p-value = 0.16). 




































































































Figure 7. Heterogeneity in Learning Rates, US and Argentina Online Experiments
notes: The total number of observations in panel A (US online experiment) is 1,552 (789 from the control group 
and 763 from the 10 variations of the Products treatment). The total number of observations in panel B (Argentina 
online sample II) is 3,653 (567 from the control group and 3,086 from the 19 variations of the Products treatment). 
For both panels, the “High Confidence” group corresponds to those who answered “sure” or “very sure” when asked 
about their confidence on their inflation perceptions, and the “Low Confidence” group corresponds to those who 
replied “somewhat sure,” “unsure,” or “very unsure.” The bars represent the coefficient  α obtained from the regres-
sion described by equation (6) for each of the pairs of mutually exclusive groups. The confidence intervals are com-
puted with robust standard errors.
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III. The Supermarket Experiment
A. remaining Hypotheses to Be Tested
The evidence from the online experiments indicates that, even when inflation sta-
tistics are readily available, individuals pay attention to prices of specific products in 
forming their inflation perceptions and expectations. This is suggestive  evidence that 
individuals use their price memories to form inflation expectations. In this section, 
we discuss an “offline” survey with supermarket customers designed to strengthen 
our understanding of this issue.
One remaining hypothesis is that, even though suggestive, these findings do not 
constitute conclusive evidence that individuals use price memories to form infla-
tion expectations. For example, subjects may have reacted to the price information 
insofar as they perceived it to be accurate, but they would not trust their own price 
memories for the same products. Another remaining hypothesis predicts whether the 
use of price memories leads to significantly biased inflation expectations: the more 
inaccurate the price memories, the more misleading their use will be.
Addressing these two remaining hypotheses requires data that is difficult to col-
lect in an online survey, because it involves products purchased by subjects, his-
torical prices of those products, individual memories of those historical prices, 
and individual inflation perceptions and expectations. Moreover, we would need a 
source of exogenous variation in the price memories of subjects. We designed and 
conducted a unique consumer intercept survey to meet all of these requirements, and 
we conducted the survey at the main exit of some supermarkets in Buenos Aires.
B. Subject Pool and Experimental Design
The consumer intercept survey was carried out in four branches of one of the 
largest supermarket chains in the city of Buenos Aires. The subject pool consisted 
of supermarket customers who had just finished shopping. When exiting the super-
market, they were invited to participate in a short survey for an academic study. 
A total of 1,200 subjects were interviewed for about three to five minutes, yield-
ing 1,140 observations with complete information about relevant outcomes. Using 
handheld scanners, the interviewers scanned respondents supermarket receipts, 
which contained product identifiers that could be matched to our online-scrapped 
price database for the supermarket chain where the study was conducted.
After providing purchase receipts for scanning, respondents were asked 12 ques-
tions. Some questions asked about the current and past prices of supermarket prod-
ucts that the individuals just bought. Specifically, respondents were asked to recall 
the current price and the price from 12 months earlier of two specific products they 
had just purchased, chosen at random by the interviewer from the receipt. The inter-
viewers selected two additional products from the receipt, read each of their prices 
out loud, and asked the respondents what they thought the prices of these two prod-
ucts had been 12 months earlier.
These questions had a double purpose: measuring the accuracy of price memories 
and the effect of price memories on inflation expectations. For the second goal, we 
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followed a design similar in spirit to the online experiments. First, we asked about 
perceptions of the inflation rate over the past year. Next, we asked individuals about 
the prices of a random set of four products. Last, we asked about expectations for 
the inflation rate for the following 12 months. This information-retrieval exercise 
intended to generate random variation in the salience of the individual’s own price 
memories about four specific products randomly chosen from the receipt. In the 
online experiments, we provided a table with specific, preselected product prices 
and price changes. This supermarket experiment also consisted of a list of four prod-
ucts at random, although this time they corresponded to products that the individ-
ual had just purchased and thus were relevant for them. Most important, instead of 
providing the historical prices for these four products, we asked respondents to “fill 
in the table” by using their own price memories. By chance, some of the products 
we made salient through this procedure corresponded to products with larger or 
smaller actual price changes, or with larger or smaller remembered price changes. 
This design allowed us to test whether making these products salient had any effect 
on subsequent individuals’ inflation expectations. Unlike in the other informational 
treatments in our study, subjects did not learn new information. Rather, we made 
information that they already had salient.28
C. Accuracy of Memories about current and Past Prices
The goal of this section is to compare the memories about current and past prices 
to the actual prices. Panel A in Figure 8 presents a scatterplot of prices for the prod-
ucts the respondents had just purchased. The prices that the respondents reported 
paying (without looking at their receipts) are on the vertical axis, and the prices 
that they actually paid are on the horizontal axis. The relationship between the two 
variables seems to be linear, with most observations clustered around the 45 degree 
line, indicating that individuals’ memories of the prices of the products they had 
just purchased were fairly accurate. Panel B in Figure 8 presents the results of a 
more taxing exercise for respondents’ memories: we present a scatterplot of respon-
dents’ reported recollections of the prices of the same goods one year earlier (ver-
tical axis) and of the actual prices one year earlier (horizontal axis), obtained from 
our database of scrapped prices for the same supermarket chain. The main pattern 
that emerges indicates that individuals’ recalled prices for one year earlier are sys-
tematically lower than the actual prices of those products at that time, as indicated 
in our database.29 Moreover, the  r 2 of the predictions provided by the individuals 
about current prices is 0.81. Although not a perfect fit, the relationship is very tight. 
However, the  r 2 drops to just 0.65 when individuals are asked about past prices. A 
significant part of that drop in predictive power is likely due to the fact that individ-
uals systematically underestimate past prices. Because individuals have relatively 
28 As a benchmark, we also included a second informational treatment that was identical to the one used in the 
online experiments, consisting of showing the actual price histories for six randomly selected products (results 
reported in the online Appendix). 
29 This underestimation of past prices may be due in part to the fact that individuals may struggle with the 
operation of projecting percentage changes into the past. See, for example, the discussion about implicit memory 
in Monroe and Lee (1999). 
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Figure 8. Results from the Supermarket Experiment
notes: The data in this figure corresponds to the Argentina Supermarket Experiment. The total number of obser-
vations is 1,140 for panels A, B, C, D, and E, and 1,127 for panel F. Panels C and D represent binned scatter plots, 
where the number of observations is almost identical across bins. The annual price changes in panels C and D 
are implicit; they are obtained from the current and past prices in Argentine pesos (AR$) reported by the respon-
dents. In panel E, the High/Low Price change corresponds to individuals above/below the median of remembered 
price changes, after controlling for inflation perceptions. In panel F, the High/Low Price change corresponds to 
individuals above/below the median actual price changes, after controlling for inflation perceptions. ES is the 
Epps–Singleton characteristic function test of equality of two distributions.
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unbiased memories of current prices but tend to underestimate past prices, they 
often overestimate price changes.
This evidence is consistent with literature in psychology documenting large 
biases in remembered prices (e.g., Bates and Gabor 1986, Kemp 1987, and Monroe 
and Lee 1999). Unlike the existing literature, however, our evidence shows that 
these biases are substantial even in a context of high inflation and in a natural envi-
ronment for consumers, such as the products and brands that the consumers actually 
buy at the supermarket.
Although price changes are overestimated on average, there may be a correlation 
between remembered price changes and actual price changes. For instance, individ-
uals might be mistakenly reporting prices from twenty months earlier rather than 
from 12 months earlier. Panel D in Figure 8 presents a comparison of the remem-
bered price changes and the actual price changes observed in our database of super-
market prices. There is a weak correlation between the two: for each  percentage 
point increase in the actual price change, the remembered price change increases by 
only 0.13 percentage points.30
In the online Appendix, we show that individuals are similarly inaccurate when 
asked about the changes in bundles of products instead of specific products. However, 
individuals may follow the evolution of prices for a different set of products (e.g., 
a handful of “favorite” goods), and their memories for these products may be more 
accurate. With this caveat in mind, in the online Appendix we show that even with 
perfectly accurate recollections, if the number of products that an individual keeps 
track of is small, that can generate substantial excess dispersion in inflation expecta-
tions, enough to explain the dispersion of inflation expectations observed in the data.
Finally, noisy memories about past prices may also arise mechanically in the 
absence of behavioral biases. For instance, in a model with information frictions 
where individuals can carry only a limited amount of information, individuals may use 
current prices and inflation perceptions to “backcast” past prices (Woodford 2009). 
However, this mechanism does not fully explain our data. For instance, a regression 
of remembered price changes on the inflation perceptions rate yields an  r 2 of 0.057, 
which suggests that the vast majority of the variation in remembered price changes 
cannot be explained by “backcasting.”
D. Evidence on the use of Actual and remembered Price changes in the 
Formation of Inflation Expectations
Panel E in Figure 8 presents evidence on the effect of remembered price changes 
on inflation expectations. It presents a comparison of the distribution of inflation 
expectations when, conditional on the individual’s inflation perceptions, we made 
salient products that the individual remembered to have larger and smaller price 
30 As a benchmark, panel C in Figure 8 presents respondents’ perceptions of aggregate inflation over the pre-
vious 12 months and the implicit average percentage price change of the products for which we requested this 
information. As expected, the correlation is positive and significant (i.e., individuals who believed inflation was 
high also believed that, on average, prices of specific products increased more). For each percentage point increase 
in perceptions of past inflation, the remembered price change increases by about 0.69 percentage points. 
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changes.31 The results from this exercise indicate that making salient those prod-
ucts with larger remembered price changes generates higher inflation expectations. 
The distributions differ significantly, as suggested by the ES test, and inflation 
 expectations are 32.77 percent for the group of products with smaller remembered 
price changes compared to 37.38 percent for the group of products with larger 
remembered price changes (the difference is significant at the 1 percent level). This 
finding suggests that individuals use their memories as consumers when forming 
their inflation expectations.32
As previously established, these memories are highly inaccurate, so this may 
generate substantial biases in expectations. To show this more directly, Panel F 
in Figure 8 presents a comparison of the distribution of inflation expectations 
between groups of individuals for which we randomly made salient those prod-
ucts whose actual price changes (rather than their price changes as remembered by 
the  respondents) were larger, following the same methodology used in panel E for 
remembered prices. The comparison of the two distributions indicates that making 
salient those products with actual larger price changes did not result in higher infla-
tion expectations. Although the p-value of the ES test suggests that the two distri-
butions differ significantly, the differences are economically small. For example, 
inflation expectations are 33.44 percent for the smaller actual price changes group, 
compared to 34.10 percent for the larger actual price changes group. The difference 
is not statistically significant at standard levels. In other words, it is the remembered 
price changes and not the actual price changes that mattered for the formation of our 
subjects’ inflation expectations.
The use of price memories as inputs for the formation of inflation expectations 
tends to induce large errors in beliefs and may cause significant dispersion in expec-
tations. This evidence is consistent with the fact that, although their price memories 
were actually strongly biased, subjects were largely unaware of these biases. When 
asked how confident they were, only 9.81 percent of subjects reported to be either 
“unsure” or “very unsure” about their answers to the questions about prices of spe-
cific products.33
IV. Conclusions
We presented evidence from a series of survey experiments in which we ran-
domly assigned respondents to treatments that provided different information 
31 Specifically, we computed the remembered price change as the average of the price changes of the four ran-
domly selected products that each respondent was asked to state. We then controlled for each individual’s inflation 
perceptions by subtracting the variation in the average remembered price change that can be explained by inflation 
perceptions, and we divided those residuals into two extreme groups: the top half (i.e., large price changes) and the 
bottom half (i.e., small price changes). 
32 In this case, unlike the other informational treatments, we did not randomize the recalled price changes 
directly, but randomized instead the salience of the recalled price changes for a group of products. As a result, esti-
mating the weight assigned to this information (the  α coefficient) with our learning regression would not yield the 
same interpretation in terms of rate of learning, as in the information provision treatments in the online experiments. 
The online Appendix presents a regression for the corresponding rate of learning, although these results should be 
interpreted with this caveat in mind. 
33 In comparison, only 9.72 percent reported “unsure” or “very unsure” as responses to the question about the 
inflation rate over the past 12 months. 
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related to inflation, such as inflation statistics or price changes for specific prod-
ucts. We used that exogenous variation to estimate the rates of learning from dif-
ferent sources of information. We document two main findings. First, consistent 
with the rational inattention model, individuals in low inflation contexts have sig-
nificantly weaker priors about the inflation rate compared to those in high inflation 
contexts. Second, we found that rational inattention is not the only significant 
source of information frictions: even when information about inflation statistics 
is made readily available to them, individuals still place significant weight on 
less accurate sources of information, such as their own memories of supermarket 
product prices.
Our findings have several implications for macroeconomic models and policy-
making. How households form inflation expectations is an important consideration 
for central banks insofar as, by anchoring expectations, the policies of monetary 
authorities attempt to influence decisions that households make about consump-
tion and investment. It is important, then, to incorporate realistic informational fric-
tions in models of household expectations and monetary policy (e.g., Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko 2015). From a more practical perspective, our findings imply that 
central banks could influence inflation expectations by disseminating information 
on individual product prices and communicating how objective, accurate, and repre-
sentative inflation statistics are.
Our findings also contribute to the discussion on the potential usefulness of 
survey data on inflation expectations. Some researchers attribute the biases in 
 household inflation expectations to the inherent limitations of self-reported data 
(Manski 2004), which implies that survey data on household expectations are 
not useful.34 Other authors argue that the failure to incorporate public infor-
mation is a natural outcome of rational inattention (Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers 
2004). This argument implies that survey data on expectations have limited value, 
because inaccurate expectations merely reveal that the respondents do not care 
about inflation. Our evidence suggests that individuals report biased beliefs on 
inflation partly because they use private sources of information (e.g., price mem-
ories), even when inflation statistics are readily available. This finding implies 
that some of the observed heterogeneity in reported inflation expectations reflects 
actual heterogeneity in deep beliefs rather than measurement error or rational 
inattention.35
34 Of course, the limitations with subjective reports must explain at least part of the dispersion in expectations. 
For example, Armantier et al. (2011) shows that even though individuals’ inflation expectations are correlated to 
their actual behavior in a financially incentivized investment experiment where future inflation affects payoffs, there 
are substantial discrepancies correlated to numeric and financial literacy. 
35 Consistent with this interpretation, our survey data reveal that even individuals with biased inflation expecta-
tions report significant confidence about their stated expectations. For individuals in the control group in the United 
States, the average levels of confidence about perceptions of past inflation of 1 percent, 2 percent, and 3 percent 
(i.e., closest to the average of statistics, 1.5 percent) are 2.6 for past inflation and 2.69 for inflation expectations (on 
a scale of 1 to 5). The figures for confidence are 2.95 and 2.85, respectively, for those whose stated perceptions of 
past inflation were −4 percent or lower or 7 percent or higher. 
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